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SUMMARY
Municipal reliance on property taxes and the competing priorities of municipalities—in terms of where 
they plan and approve land development within their boundaries—in order to capture new property 
taxes, has led to political conflict between adjacent municipalities.1 Nowhere in Alberta is this more 
evident than in the Edmonton and Calgary metropolitan regions, where sustained high-levels of 
growth has led to the expansion of the core-cities, rapid residential development rates in peripheral 
urban centres and the rise urban-scale development in the rural municipal districts – spurring intra-
metropolitan competition, harsh words and hurt feelings amongst municipalities.2 In response to this 
ongoing conflict, the province and at times the municipalities themselves have developed successive 
regional planning frameworks over the past 60 years3 to guide development and encourage—and at 
times enforce—intermunicipal collaboration.
In an exploration of the contemporary relationship between municipal finance and development 
patterns in the Calgary and Edmonton metropolitan regions, we use municipal property tax and 
building-permit data for new residential, commercial and industrial development to track the incidence 
of development since 1983 and the property tax rates for municipalities in both regions from 2001 
to 2015. In looking at the tax data there is evidence of increasing competition among municipalities, 
in particular for non-residential development; however, the trends could also be consistent with 
collusion. In looking at the building permit data, although there has been a lot of development 
in the peripheral urban and rural municipalities, proportionately, growth and development has 
occurred overwhelmingly in the core-cities. Our findings point to a system where local development 
considerations in both metropolitan regions, and the municipal prerogative to set municipal tax rates 
to attract development, take precedence over the regional planning frameworks in place.
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For past examples see, for Edmonton, T.J. Plunkett and James Lightbody, “Tribunals, Politics, and the Public Interest: The Edmonton 
Annexation Case,” Canadian Public Policy 8, 2 (Spring 1982): 207-221; and for Calgary, Geoff Ghitter and Alan Smart, “Mad Cows, 
Regional Governance, and Urban Sprawl: Path Dependence and Unintended Consequences in the Calgary Region,” Urban Affairs 
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For examples see Bailey Hildebrand, “Battle brewing as Chestermere attempts to annex land to block development.” Calgary Herald, 
December 20, 2015, http://calgaryherald.com/news/local-news/development-battle-brewing-as-chestermere-attempts-to-annex-
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1INTRODUCTION
Alberta’s municipalities generate local revenue through property taxes, user fees for services, 
licensing systems, and a host of discretionary tax tools and development-related levies afforded 
to them by the Municipal Government Act (MGA). The most important of these are property 
taxes, which for Alberta’s largest cities, Calgary and Edmonton, accounted for 31.6 per cent 
and 39.0 per cent of their respective total revenue in 2014.4 What makes property taxes unique 
compared to the many other tax tools available under the MGA is that they are intrinsically 
linked to the present use and, by extension, the value of land. This spatial quality, and the 
relative importance of property taxes to a given municipality’s bottom line, has influenced 
many municipalities in Alberta as they focus on physical growth as a means to increase their 
revenue base. This growth takes the form of land-use intensification—turning undeveloped, 
agricultural, or brownfield land into a more “profitable” use—which is either promoted through 
a municipality’s development policies or in some instances undertaken by the municipality 
itself. In this paper, we explore the relationships between municipal finance and development 
patterns in the Calgary and Edmonton metropolitan regions. In particular, we seek to better 
understand whether the source of local government revenues and reliance on property taxes 
takes precedence over regional planning in the development decisions of municipalities. 
The paper is organized into four sections. In Section 1, we introduce our study areas, which 
are a hybrid of municipalities within Calgary’s and Edmonton’s Census Metropolitan Areas 
and regional planning frameworks, and discuss the growth and distribution of the metropolitan 
population. In Section 2, we describe metropolitan planning in Alberta, with special attention 
paid to the regional planning frameworks that direct development in the Calgary and Edmonton 
Regions. In Section 3, we describe trends in property taxation, the largest own-source revenue 
for the municipal governments in the Calgary and Edmonton Regions. In Section 4, we 
describe the location of residential, commercial, and industrial development in the Calgary 
and Edmonton Regions. To conclude, we summarize our observations on the implications 
of municipal revenue generation on metropolitan development. Before we explore this issue, 
however, it is important that we review two prominent economic models on the impact of 
property taxation on the extent and timing of land development in urban areas. 
Literature on Municipal Revenue Generation and Land Development 
Land development is fundamentally driven by market forces arising from population increase, 
rising incomes and low(er) commuting/travel costs. As Brueckner notes,5 development may not 
be welfare maximizing because of market failures such as: 6
• commuters do not pay the marginal social costs of congestion and pollution or the 
construction and maintenance costs of roads and freeways, leading to pressures to make 
excessive investment in road infrastructure;
4 In 2014, Calgary was less reliant on property taxes than Edmonton because Calgary received a larger share of its revenues 
from sales and user charges and provincial transfers than Edmonton. For a general discussion of the current and prospective 
revenue sources of Calgary and Edmonton, see Melville McMillan and Bev Dahlby, “Do Municipal Governments Need 
More Tax Powers? A Background Paper on Municipal Finance in Alberta,” University of Calgary School of Public Policy 
Research Paper 7, 33 (November 2014).
5 
Jan K. Brueckner, “Urban Sprawl: Lessons from Urban Economics,” Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs (2001): 
65-97.
6 
See Brueckner, “Urban Sprawl,” for an empirical study, based on 40 small to modest-sized urban areas, on the forces 
underlying urban expansion, which he identifies as population growth, household income, agricultural land value/rent, and 
commuting costs.
2• new development on the periphery may be subsidized with developers paying less than 
the marginal cost of roadways, utilities and other infrastructure; and
• the externalities generated by agricultural land and open space may not be properly 
reflected in land prices.
The basic problem (at least from the economist’s perspective) is to get the prices right so the 
market allocates land to its most valuable uses from a broad social perspective. Given the 
often-expressed concerns over perceived inefficient development of land, i.e., sparse residential 
densities referred to as “sprawl,” a range of possible causes and potential solutions has been 
considered, including the way municipalities generate revenue.
Economists have developed models of the effect of municipal revenue generation on land 
development, two of which are of particular importance to this paper. In the first model, 
Brueckner7 develops a spatial model of a city, with a fixed number of residents, to analyze 
of the effect of property taxes on population density. Residential development involves 
investments of capital on land to produce dwellings of a fixed size (a given number of square 
feet). More capital invested per unit of land results in taller structures, more dwellings per unit 
of land, and higher population density. Commuting costs vary with distance to the centre of 
the city. As a result, housing prices are higher the closer the dwelling is to the centre of the 
city and land rents decline with distance from the centre. The geographic area of the city is 
determined by the condition that land rent from residential development at the city’s boundary 
is equal to the rent obtained from agricultural land use. In the context of this model, a property 
tax increase has an income effect and a capital-intensity effect on land use. An increase in 
the property tax, by reducing residents’ disposable incomes, changes the slope of the land-
rent gradient, lowering land rent near the centre of the city and increasing it at the existing 
boundary. This induces an expansion of residential development on existing agricultural 
property and the population density of the city declines. This income effect is not unique to 
property taxes and would be generated by any local tax increase, including a local sales tax 
or a local income tax. However, the property tax also has a capital-intensity effect because it 
raises the cost of capital, and this reduces the amount of capital invested per unit of land, i.e., it 
becomes relatively more costly to build taller residential structures. This reduces the number of 
dwellings per unit of land and induces an increase in the area of the city and, in turn, sprawl. 
Thus, the Brueckner model predicts that a higher property tax will increase sprawl, perhaps 
more than other taxes, because of the capital-intensity effect that is not present with sales or 
income taxes. However, Brueckner notes that this conclusion is conditional on a key assumption 
of the model: that dwelling sizes are fixed. If this assumption were relaxed, a property tax 
increase would create an incentive to reduce dwelling sizes, which would increase population 
density at any given location, reducing the area of the city and increasing overall population 
density. With this caveat, Brueckner draws the rather weak conclusion that “property taxation 
may belong on the list of factors causing inefficient spatial expansion of cities…”8 
In the second model, Arnott9 develops a model of the timing and intensity of investment in land 
development. The model assumes that a landowner has a unit of vacant land, and that the rent 
per unit of floor area of a structure is known and will increase over time. Once a structure is 
7 
Jan K. Brueckner, “Property Taxation and Urban Sprawl,” in Property Taxation and Local Government Finance, ed. 
Wallace E. Oates (Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, May 2001), 153-172.
8 
Brueckner, “Property Taxation,” 13.
9 
Richard Arnott, “Effects of Property Taxation on Development Timing and Density: Policy Perspectives,” Brookings-
Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs (2006): 189-230.
3built, it does not depreciate and cannot be redeveloped. The owner maximizes the present value 
of the income from the property by deciding when to develop it and how much capital to invest, 
which will determine the density of the development. The model is sufficiently complex that 
the effect of a property tax increase has an ambiguous effect on the timing, and the amount, of 
capital invested. However, for reasonable parameter values, a property tax increase is shown to 
reduce the amount of capital invested and to delay the timing of the investment.10
The models of taxation and land use developed by Brueckner and Arnott provide interesting 
insights, but the interactions of the key variables—housing prices, land rents, dwelling sizes, 
the timing of development—are complex, and the consequences for land use are difficult 
to predict, especially in the United States where local governments have access to a variety 
of revenue sources. While the property tax is a mainstay of local government finance in the 
United States, many municipalities also impose sales taxes and even local income taxes. In this 
environment, more or less reliance on property taxes implies less or more reliance upon sales 
or income taxes if tax revenues are to be constant. Thus, there is a trade-off, or balance, among 
two or three sources of local tax revenues in most states. The choice may be a significant 
determinant of land use because property taxes impose a cost on holding land—a cost that 
may be particularly significant for undeveloped land. Where local sales and/or income taxes 
substitute for property taxes, the cost of holding property is reduced as the cost of financing 
local services is shifted from property owners to consumers and income earners.
In Alberta, the anticipated adoption of the Modernized Municipal Government Act in the fall 
of 2017, with specific legislation tied to a “Big City Charter” for Edmonton and Calgary, would 
open the door to a more complex mix of local tax levers for the councils of both cities. The 
implications for land use due to varying reliance on different tax bases is complicated, but we 
suspect that a greater reliance on property taxation should discourage sprawl. For example, 
reliance on sales taxation may encourage sprawl if new commercial developments occur on the 
fringe of the metropolitan area due to municipalities in the urban hinterland imposing lower 
sales tax rates than the core city.11 The impact of municipal revenue generation on sprawl, in 
particular, is analyzed in detail in the accompanying paper: “Municipal Revenue Generation 
and Sprawl: Implications for the Calgary and Edmonton Metropolitan Regions Derived from an 
Extension of ‘Causes of Sprawl’ (Technical Paper).”
1. ALBERTA’S METROPOLITAN REGIONS & THEIR POPULATIONS
In defining both metropolitan regions, we have chosen to integrate the list of municipalities 
within the Statistics Canada Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) with the municipalities in 
the regional planning frameworks in place around Calgary (the Calgary Regional Partnership) 
and Edmonton (the Capital Region Board), as shown in Table 3. Importantly, for the Calgary 
Region we have included the four municipal districts that withdrew from the planning 
framework in 2012 and the three peripheral urban municipalities of Banff, Canmore and 
Nanton that withdrew earlier in 2016.
Municipalities in each metropolitan region, illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, have been organized 
into three categories: 1) the core-cities of Calgary and Edmonton, 2) the peripheral urban 
10 
See Arnott, “Effects of,” 202, Table 1.
11 
For example, see Daria Burnes, David Neumark and Michelle J. White, “Fiscal Zoning and Sales Taxes: Do Higher Sales 
Taxes Lead to More Retailing and Less Manufacturing?” National Tax Journal 67, 1 (2014): 7-50.
4municipalities, which includes the smaller cities, towns and villages, and 3) the rural municipal 
districts (MDs)—many of which have branded themselves as Counties—in which we have 
grouped the specialized municipality of Strathcona County. Federally administered Indian 
Reserves, Summer Villages (a form of urban secondary residence municipality) and the 
Townsite of Redwood Meadows have been excluded in this analysis. 
While the planning frameworks incorporate municipalities that at first glance may seem 
peculiar—either in terms of distance between the core-city and the peripheral urban 
municipality, such as Edmonton to Lamont (74 kilometres) or Calgary to Nanton (92 
kilometres), or population, with Wabamun at 661 residents and Beiseker at 785—the CMAs, in 
particular Calgary’s, do not account for municipalities that are important players in the regional 
economy, such as the MD of Foothills and the Town of Okotoks.
TABLE 1 MUNICIPALITIES WITHIN ALBERTA’S METROPOLITAN REGIONS BY POPULATION IN 2011
Calgary Metropolitan Region (19 municipalities) Edmonton Metropolitan Region (25 municipalities)
Name Status CMA(8)
CRP
(14) Pop. Name Status
CMA
(23)
CRB
(24) Pop.
Calgary City Y Y 1,096,833 Edmonton City Y Y 812,201
Airdrie City Y Y 42,564 Strathcona County SM Y Y 92,490
Rocky View County MD Y F 36,461 St. Albert City Y Y 61,466
Okotoks Town N Y 24,511 Parkland County MD Y Y 30,568
Foothills No. 31 MD N F 21,258 Spruce Grove City Y Y 26,171
Cochrane Town Y Y 17,580 Leduc City Y Y 24,279
Chestermere Town Y Y 14,824 Sturgeon County MD Y Y 19,578
High River Town N Y 12,920 Fort Saskatchewan City Y Y 19,051
Strathmore Town N Y 12,305 Stony Plain Town Y Y 15,051
Canmore Town N F 12,288 Leduc County MD Y Y 13,541
Wheatland County MD N F 8,285 Beaumont Town Y Y 13,284
Banff Town N F 7,584 Morinville Town Y Y 8,569
Crossfield Town Y F 2,853 Devon Town Y Y 6,510
Black Diamond Town N Y 2,373 Lamont County MD N Y 3,872
Turner Valley Town N Y 2,167 Gibbons Town Y Y 3,030
Nanton Town N F 2,132 Calmar Town Y Y 1,970
Bighorn No. 8 MD N F 1,341 Redwater Town Y Y 1,915
Irricana Town Y Y 1,162 Lamont Town N Y 1,753
Beiseker Village Y N 785 Bon Accord Town Y Y 1,488
Legal Town Y Y 1,225
Bruderheim Town Y Y 1,155
Legend Thorsby Village Y Y 951
Y=Yes Warburg Village Y Y 789
N=No Wabamun Village Y Y 661
F=Former Spring Lake Village Y N 533
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7Population Concentration
Key to understanding Alberta’s metropolitan regions is the fact that the population in each 
is overwhelmingly concentrated in its respective core-city. As shown in Table 2, in 2011 
Calgary had 83.1 per cent of the region’s population, while the remaining 14 peripheral urban 
municipalities accounted for 11.8 per cent and the four municipal districts accounted for 5.1 
per cent. Likewise, Edmonton accounted for 69.9 per cent of the region’s population, while the 
remaining 19 peripheral urban municipalities accounted for 16.3 per cent and the municipal 
districts, along with Strathcona County, accounted for 13.8 per cent.
TABLE 2 SHARE OF POPULATION IN ALBERTA’S METROPOLITAN REGION MUNICIPALITIES IN 2011
Metropolitan Region Metropolitan Population Percentage in the Core-City Percentage in Peripheral 
Urban Centres
Percentage in Municipal 
Districts
Calgary 1,320,226 83.1 11.8  5.1
Edmonton 1,161,568 69.9 16.3 13.8
When comparing the Calgary and Edmonton Regions, there is a major difference in the degree 
of concentration in the respective core-cities. In the Calgary Region, this concentration of 83.1 
per cent is largely the result of incremental annexations that have allowed Calgary to maintain 
control over its immediate environs. As noted by Sancton:
The official position of the City of Calgary is to maintain at least a 30-year supply of 
developable land within its boundaries. Having this land supply allows for the long-term 
planning necessary to accommodate Calgary’s high rate of growth and to facilitate the 
planning and budgeting of infrastructure (sewers, roads). Periodic annexations are proposed 
to maintain a long-term land supply. The City claims that its annexation policy is a key part 
of Calgary’s growth management strategy. 12
As argued by The City of Calgary, its approach to annexation:
helps ensure that sprawl does not occur, that is, haphazard development, often at very low 
density. Calgary’s planned suburban communities now achieve densities of 6 to 8 dwelling 
units per acre. This is almost 40% denser than communities built in the 1970’s and 1980’s, 
and some 12 to 16 times more land efficient than existing rural residential development 
outside Calgary’s borders. 13
Calgary’s approach has been made easier due to the absence of large urban municipalities 
directly adjacent to its boundaries since major annexations in the 1960s absorbed the towns 
of Bowness and Forest Lawn, and the village of Montgomery. As a result, annexations by The 
City of Calgary over the last 50 years have consisted primarily of agricultural lands along with 
the rural hamlets of Midnapore and Shepard. 
Edmonton’s lower share of the metropolitan region’s population, at 69.9 per cent, is largely 
because there are several significantly sized municipalities that are immediately adjacent, 
including Strathcona County (92,490), and St. Albert (61,466). The City of Edmonton tried 
12 
Andrew Sancton, “The Governance of Metropolitan Areas in Canada,” Public Administration and Development 25 (2005): 321.
13 
Calgary City of 2004. Annexation frequently asked questions in Andrew Sancton, “The Governance of Metropolitan Areas 
in Canada” Public Administration and Development 25 (2005): 321.
8to annex both Strathcona County and St. Albert in 1979; however, the application was highly 
contentious and was rejected by the approval authority of the day, the Local Authorities Board, 
after 106 days of testimony.14
Population Growth
Looking first at the Calgary Region (Figure 3), the population of the core-city of Calgary grew 
by 24 per cent between 2002 and 2012, a growth rate that was much lower than peripheral 
urban municipalities such as Chestermere (310 per cent), Okotoks (114 per cent), and Airdrie 
(108 per cent). However, the larger base population in Calgary (904,987 in 2002) has meant that 
the city’s growth represents 74 per cent of the total population growth in the region. The other 
three municipalities were responsible for four, five and eight per cent of regional population 
growth respectively. The populations of the MD of Foothills and Rocky View County grew by 
27 per cent and 19 per cent respectively, but these municipalities accounted for only two per 
cent of the total regional population growth.
FIGURE 3 POPULATION GROWTH WITHIN THE CALGARY METROPOLITAN REGION FROM 2002 TO 2012
 
The same pattern can be seen in the Edmonton Region (Figure 4). The towns of Beaumont 
(96 per cent) and Stony Plain (57 per cent), and the cities of St. Albert (64 per cent) and Leduc 
(70 per cent) show rapid growth, but respectively account for only three, two, four and five per 
cent of the regional share in population growth. Whereas, while the core city of Edmonton 
grew at 23 per cent, it represented 66 per cent of the total population growth in the region. 
14 
Plunkett and Lightbody “Tribunals, Politics” 207. 
9Strathcona County grew 28 per cent between 2002 and 2012, representing nine per cent of 
regional population growth. Growth within the rural municipalities—Leduc County (eight per 
cent), Lamont County (negative seven per cent), Sturgeon County (eight per cent) and Parkland 
County (12 per cent)—was negligible from a regional perspective. In sum, the core-cities in 
both metropolitan regions have been the sites of the majority of the population growth over the 
period 2002 to 2012.
FIGURE 4 POPULATION GROWTH WITHIN THE EDMONTON METROPOLITAN REGION FROM 2002 TO 2012
 
2. METROPOLITAN PLANNING IN ALBERTA
In order to understand development within the Calgary and Edmonton Metropolitan Regions, 
it is important to start with a review of the contemporary legislative framework in which 
municipalities in Alberta function – one that, while set to change with the forthcoming 
Modernized Municipal Government Act, has been the status quo for over 20 years. The 
enactment of the 1995 Municipal Government Act and disbandment of the system of 10 urban-
10
oriented Regional Planning Commissions,15 which had exercised subdivision approval in their 
hinterlands for almost 40 years, effectively eliminated longstanding functional differences 
between urban and rural municipalities. For the first time in decades, municipal districts gained 
the ability to direct development in their own jurisdictions and, importantly, “taxation revenue 
derived from local development, which under regional planning had flowed to cities (as the 
primary provider of regional urban infrastructure), was redirected to local government.”16 
This means that today, the primary intermunicipal governance mechanism in Alberta is the 
voluntary system of statutory local-to-local Intermunicipal Development Plans originally 
developed in 1977 in recognition that “while development on or near the boundaries (between 
municipalities) often had regional dimensions, the real stake-holders were the neighbouring 
municipalities themselves.”17 While this bilateral system functions well in many areas of the 
province, it was seen to be inadequate to address the needs of Alberta’s largest cities, Calgary 
and Edmonton, and the complex intermunicipal relationships in their metropolitan regions. And 
it wasn’t long until municipalities in both regions began rebuilding regional-planning areas. 
Calgary Regional Partnership 
The Calgary Regional Partnership is a voluntary association of urban municipalities, currently 
with 11 members, created in 1999 in anticipation of rapid growth in the metropolitan region. 
The regional planning framework put forth by the Calgary Regional Partnership is the Calgary 
Metropolitan Plan, which contains a 62-year planning horizon (from 2014 to 2076) designed 
to direct development throughout the region. Participants of the Calgary Regional Partnership 
must align their statutory plans to the Calgary Metropolitan Plan; however, the regional 
partnership does not have jurisdiction on local land-use decisions, statutory plan approvals, 
annexations, nor intermunicipal negotiations. The planning philosophy adopted by the Calgary 
Regional Partnership focuses on urban containment and growth management, as stated within 
the Calgary Metropolitan Plan:
If our planning process revealed one thing, it’s that the status quo is not sustainable. If 
development continues at its current pace, without coordinated regional planning, our 
region’s urban development footprint is sure to increase dramatically. In fact, our modelling 
suggests that our development footprint could grow by 125,000 hectares or more over the 
next 50 to 60 years. The fiscal impacts associated with this type of unmanaged growth are 
unsustainable for governments, municipalities and future taxpayers, not to mention the 
impacts of the status quo on the land, water and quality  
of life in the region.
With its regional approach to planning, the Calgary Metropolitan Plan represents an 
opportunity to ensure development can be more efficient and compact. By implementing 
the goals in the Plan, we can expect to see a 70 per cent reduction in land used for urban 
development in the future. Infrastructure costs will decrease proportionately, benefitting us 
all.18
15 
It should be noted that several of the RPC’s continued to function as independent planning firms such as the Oldman River 
Regional Services Commission based in Lethbridge, and Parkland Community Planning Services based in Red Deer.
16 
Ghitter and Smart, “Mad Cows,” 625.
17 Frederick Laux, Planning Law and Practice in Alberta (3rd ed.), (Edmonton: Juriliber Ltd., 2010), 1, 42-43.
18 Calgary Regional Partnership, Calgary Metropolitan Plan (2014): 11.
11
The Calgary Metropolitan Plan was approved by Calgary Regional Partnership members in the 
summer of 2012 after several years of contentious negotiations that saw all four rural municipal 
districts—the MD of Foothills, Rocky View County, Wheatland County and the MD of 
Bighorn—withdraw. Their withdrawal was followed by the towns of Crossfield and High River, 
and the Townsite of Redwood Meadows (an autonomous town situated on land leased from the 
Tsuut’ina First Nation); High River and Redwood Meadows have since rejoined. 
In light of the loss of its rural members, the Calgary Regional Partnership, and in particular 
Calgary Mayor Naheed Nenshi, have taken the position that the Calgary Metropolitan Plan 
should be legislated, thereby forcing mandatory membership on all municipalities within 
the Calgary Metropolitan Plan’s planning area.19 In 2013, the Calgary Regional Partnership 
entered mediation over potential membership with the municipal districts directly adjacent to 
Calgary—Rocky View and Foothills. However, the mediation process hit a dead end when the 
working group was unable to reach consensus with respect to a new voting structure for critical 
decisions. 
As it currently stands, each of the partnership’s member municipalities holds a seat at the 
General Assembly from where they are entitled to appoint one person to sit on the Board 
of Directors. These members of the Board have the task of selecting five members among 
themselves to fill the roles of the Executive Committee. This Executive Committee is tasked 
with the day-to-day governance of the Calgary Regional Partnership. Decision-making at the 
executive committee level is consensus based wherever possible, and when a vote is required 
it is based on a simple majority. However, in instances where there are proposed amendments 
to the Calgary Metropolitan Plan or decisions on the planning, co-ordination and governance 
of the regional water, wastewater and transit systems, a vote is required that must be supported 
by “not less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Directors that represent Member Municipalities that 
collectively have not less than a majority of the population of all the Member Municipalities.”20 
This effective monopoly on all regional decision voting by the City of Calgary, because of 
its share of the regional population, was the main reason the 2013 mediation process was 
unsuccessful.
Capital Region Board
Metropolitan planning in the Edmonton Region began in the same vein as the Calgary Regional 
Partnership, as a voluntary association of municipalities known as the Alberta Capital Region 
Alliance, formed in 1998 under the moniker “A Community of Communities.” However, 
unlike the Calgary Regional Partnership, the provincial government initiated a governance 
review of the capital region “…for the purposes of developing a vision for its future, identifying 
partnerships or initiatives, and establishing a role for the province in attaining that collective 
vision.”21 As detailed by LeSage and Stefanick:22 
19 
Richard Cuthbertson, “Calgary Mayor and Municipal Affairs Minister Exchange Barbs Over Growth Plan,” Calgary 
Herald, February 11, 2013, http://www.calgaryherald.com/news/Calgary+mayor+ municipal+affairs+minister+ 
exchange+barbs+ over+growth+plan/7946269/story.html#ixzz2KktBVbwN, accessed June 15, 2015.
20 Calgary Regional Partnership, Board of Directors Handbook October 2015 (2015), 71. 
21 Gerald Hodge and Ira M. Robinson, Planning Canadian Regions (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2002), 259.
22 
Edward C. LeSage Jr., and Lorna Stefanick, “New Regionalist Metropolitan Action: The Case of the Alberta Capital Region 
Alliance” (presented at the Canadian Political Science Association meetings, Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 2004).
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In December 1998 the Minister of Municipal Affairs announced the creation of the 
Alberta Capital Region Governance Review (Alberta Capital Region Governance Review 
2000) [known as the Hyndman Review]. Even though the policy problem or problems 
behind the review were never fully articulated, the minister was adamant that the “status 
quo will not do.” In all likelihood the problem was the total absence of rural municipal 
participation in the Forum and the general lack of any development control or (at that time) 
convincing regional economic development initiative in the region. The Capital Region was 
unfavourably compared in the press with Calgary, with suggestions that the southern city 
was more economically dynamic and competitive owing to its de facto “unicity” status.23 
Eight years passed between the publication of the Hyndman Review and passing of the Capital 
Region Board Regulation (Alta Reg 38/2012) on April 15, 2008.24 The resultant Capital 
Region Board is a corporation, deemed to be a regional services commission per Section 15.1 
of the MGA consisting of 24 member municipalities (urban, rural and specialized) over an 
area of 11,933 square kilometres. As outlined in the Capital Region Board Regulation, the 
Board’s responsibilities include the preparation and implementation of the regional planning 
framework, known as the Capital Region Growth Plan, in addition to co-ordinating cost-
sharing policies for municipalities that participate in regional projects. Per Section 2(4), 
each member municipality must appoint a councillor as representative to the board.25 Each 
representative has one vote, and if a decision is made by a vote it must be “supported by not 
fewer than 17 representatives from participating municipalities that collectively have at least 
75% of the population in the Capital Region,” meaning that the City of Edmonton has to vote in 
favour of a given item for it to succeed; however, smaller municipalities can prevent Edmonton 
from controlling the region by voting against an item.26 
The Capital Region Growth Plan is a 35-year growth strategy based on coordinated decision-
making across the region along four priority areas: land use, intermunicipal transit, housing, 
and geographic information services. While the Capital Region Growth Plan does not replace 
existing intermunicipal development plans within the Edmonton metropolitan planning 
region, it is the “prevailing document” meaning that all statutory plans and bylaws of member 
municipalities must conform to the plan. The ‘2010 Capital Region Growth Plan: Growing 
Forward,’ was recently updated with a new plan entitled ‘2016 Edmonton Metropolitan Region 
Growth Plan: Re-imagine. Plan. Build.’ 2010’s Growing Forward remains in effect until 
provincial approval of the new plan, delivered to the Government of Alberta for its approval on 
October 13, 2016, is granted.
A Series of Acts Concerning Metropolitan Planning
Ongoing concerns of the bilateral nature of the majority of regional planning across Alberta—
primarily conducted through intermunicipal development plans—led to the introduction 
of the highly controversial Bill 28, the Modernizing Regional Governance Act, in 2013. 
The Bill, which would have given the province the power to set up regional growth boards, 
appoint members, and set mandates while retaining the final word on all decisions, received 
immediate criticism from municipalities over fears it would destroy local autonomy. An 
23 ibid, 13.
24 Much of this delay rested on disagreement between municipalities on an appropriate voting structure, as detailed in LeSage 
and Stefanick., “New Regionalist.”
25 
Canada. Alberta, “Capital Region Board Regulation, Alta Reg 38/2012,” s.2(4), http://canlii.ca/t/lft6, accessed July 15, 2015. 
26 ibid.
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amended version, renamed the Enabling Regional Growth Boards Act, was passed on Dec. 
11, 2013 and incorporated into the MGA (Part 17.1). The key amendment to this act was 
Amendment AIC, which added a purpose statement noting the voluntary nature of municipal 
participation; as it reads in Section 708.011 of the MGA: “The purpose of this Part is to 
enable 2 or more municipalities to initiate, on a voluntary basis, the establishment of a growth 
management board to provide for integrated and strategic planning for future growth in 
those municipalities.” When the new Part 17.1 came into force, the Capital Region Board was 
recognized as a growth-management board (see MGA s. 708.25). The passing of Bill 20, the 
Municipal Government Amendment Act, 2015, on March 14, 2015, saw legislation brought 
forward on how growth-management boards should conduct meetings. 
The idea of growth management boards has evolved under the Notley government with the 
commitment on Sept. 25, 2015, by then minister of municipal affairs, Deron Bilous, to create 
new growth management boards as part of revised Municipal Government Act legislation.27 
In response to the announcement, Banff, Canmore, Nanton, and Irricana withdrew from the 
Calgary Regional Partnership in early 2016, with Irricana rejoining the same year in late-
November.
The legislation referred to by Bilous is now known as Bill 21, the Modernized Municipal 
Government Act, which received first reading on May 31, 2016. The draft legislation outlines 
a future of enforced intermunicipal collaboration province-wide. In fact, Section 3, which 
details the purpose of a municipality, has been amended to include “to work collaboratively 
with neighboring municipalities to plan, deliver and fund intermunicipal services.”28 As seen 
in Section 129 of the draft Bill 21, Calgary will be required to establish a growth management 
board, meaning that Calgary and its surrounding municipalities will be forced to collaborate on 
planning issues within the metropolitan region. Just which municipalities will be mandated to 
join a new Calgary Region growth management board is not clear at the time of writing.
3. PROPERTY TAXATION IN ALBERTA’S METROPOLITAN REGIONS29
Alberta’s municipalities can set a different property tax rate (in mills) on the assessed value 
of residential property from the tax rate on non-residential property, principally machinery 
and equipment, linear property, railways and other commercial and industrial property.30 
Machinery and equipment property includes materials, devices, fittings, installations, 
appliances, and apparatus that form an integral part in manufacturing, processing, coal 
and oilsands excavation and/or transportation, telecommunications, and electric power 
systems. Linear property includes electric power systems whose rates are controlled or set 
by the Alberta Utilities Commission, street lighting and telecommunications systems, and 
27 
Government of Alberta, “Municipal Government Act to Change How Municipalities Work Together,” http://www.alberta.
ca/release.cfm?xID= 385783474FDD3-FEE1-EF33-B2FA06E96AF4B33F accessed October 15, 2016 
28 
Legislative Assembly of Alberta, “Bill 21 Modernized Municipal Government Act,” http://www.assembly.ab.ca/ISYS/
LADDAR_files/docs/bills/bill/ legislature_29/session_2/20160308_bill-021.pdf accessed October 15, 2016
29 All of the municipal revenue and property tax rate data in this section were obtained from the Alberta Municipal Affairs 
website, http://municipalaffairs.alberta.ca/municipal_financial_statistical_data
30 
The Alberta Municipal Affairs data on property taxation refer to other commercial and industrial property as “land and 
improvements excluding machinery and equipment,” but we will use the more descriptive term “commercial and industrial” 
property. In some municipalities, the tax rate on farmland is different rate from the residential rate.
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pipelines.31 For assessment purposes, railways, farmland, machinery and equipment, and 
linear property are defined as “regulated” property and valued using regulated rates provided 
annually in the Municipal Affairs Minister’s Guidelines. For all other types of properties—
residential, commercial, and industrial properties—market value is the basis for assessments. 
Municipalities are responsible for preparing assessments for all property, with the exception of 
linear property assessments, which are the responsibility of Municipal Affairs. 
The effective property tax rate in a municipality depends on the assessment ratio or standard 
as well as on the municipal tax rate. Since assessment practices can vary from municipality to 
municipality, a given mill rate can represent a different effective property tax rate. To make 
the mill rates comparable across municipalities, we have adjusted them according to variations 
in the education mill rate, which is set by the province, and which varies from municipality to 
municipality, presumably because of variations in assessment ratios. In the Calgary Region, we 
have standardized the municipal tax rates to Calgary’s assessment standard, which is reflected 
in the education property tax rate in the city of Calgary. To illustrate how the effective mill 
rates are calculated, Airdrie’s non-residential mill rate is 8.0333, but its effective non-residential 
mill rate is 7.4495, because its assessment ratio appears to be 92.7 per cent of Calgary’s ratio 
as reflected in their respective education property tax rates (3.3047 and 3.5637). The same 
procedure is used for Edmonton Region municipalities, but using the Edmonton’s education 
mill rate to calculate the effective mill rates.
Sources of Revenue for Municipal Governments in the Calgary  
Metropolitan Region
Table 3 shows the composition of municipal revenues in the Calgary Region in 2014. On 
average, property taxes represented 32 per cent of municipal revenues, and were the largest 
single source of revenue for most municipal governments. Sales and user charges were the 
second-largest source of revenues for most of the urban municipalities, but they were a 
relatively small contributor to revenues in the four municipal districts. Business taxes, which 
represented 4.6 per cent of the city of Calgary’s revenues in 2014, were not a significant source 
of revenues for the other municipalities. Reliance on provincial transfers varied considerable 
across municipalities in part because of provincial programs to alleviate the 2013 flood damage 
in High River, Black Diamond, Turner Valley, Canmore, and the MD of Bighorn. Because of 
the wide variation in federal and provincial transfers, in part due to the flood relief, property 
taxes as a percentage of own-source revenues is a better measure of municipal reliance on 
property taxes. For Calgary, property taxes were 38.2 per cent of own-source revenues. In the 
peripheral urban municipalities, property taxes were 43.6 per cent of own-source revenues. The 
four municipal districts were the most dependent on property taxes, averaging 69.7 per cent of 
own-source revenues. 
31 
Not included in this analysis are franchise fees, which are charges against utilities for use of public land within a given 
municipality; generally speaking, they are levied on electricity, gas, and water service providers separate from linear 
property taxes. 
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TABLE 3 COMPOSITION OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE IN THE CALGARY REGION IN 201432
MUNICIPALITY Municipal Property Taxes
Sales and User 
Charges
Franchise and 
Concession 
Contracts
Contributed and 
Donated Assets
Federal 
Government 
Conditional and 
Unconditional 
Transfers
Provincial 
Government 
Conditional and 
Unconditional 
Transfers
Other
CALGARY 31.6% 25.1% 4.7% 5.2% 1.2% 16.0% 16.2%
AIRDRIE 27.7% 22.6% 3.4% 16.0% 2.6% 3.5% 24.2%
BANFF 38.2% 25.5% 1.9% 0.0% 0.5% 14.9% 19.0%
BEISEKER 51.2% 26.9% 1.4% 0.5% 0.1% 5.3% 14.6%
BLACK 
DIAMOND 20.9% 9.7% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 58.2% 9.8%
CANMORE 28.8% 21.1% 2.3% 2.1% 0.0% 34.5% 11.2%
CHESTERMERE 39.4% 9.1% 0.0% 13.7% 0.0% 23.4% 14.5%
COCHRANE 23.1% 17.2% 2.5% 26.7% 1.4% 10.9% 18.2%
CROSSFIELD 37.4% 27.5% 1.6% 10.6% 0.0% 13.0% 9.9%
HIGH RIVER 11.4% 9.3% 1.7% 11.6% 0.5% 44.4% 21.0%
IRRICANA 45.0% 21.1% 1.1% 0.0% 17.4% 5.1% 10.3%
NANTON 43.5% 19.8% 2.5% 0.1% 0.0% 13.3% 20.9%
OKOTOKS 32.4% 32.0% 2.2% 7.4% 1.5% 12.9% 11.8%
STRATHMORE 41.6% 43.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.5% 6.3%
TURNER VALLEY 16.8% 10.8% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 66.1% 5.1%
Unweighted 
Average 32.7% 21.2% 1.6% 6.3% 1.7% 22.4% 14.1%
BIGHORN NO. 8, 
M.D. OF 21.7% 4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 61.1% 12.4%
FOOTHILLS NO. 
31, M.D. OF 37.1% 2.7% 0.0% 3.5% 1.4% 48.2% 7.1%
ROCKY VIEW 
COUNTY 50.5% 8.3% 0.0% 6.3% 0.0% 16.0% 18.9%
WHEATLAND 
COUNTY 70.1% 2.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 19.0% 8.6%
Unweighted 
Average 44.9% 4.5% 0.0% 2.5% 0.4% 36.1% 11.7%
The median per capita property tax revenue in the 19 municipalities in the Calgary Region in 
2014 was $957, but the range was very large. Two municipal districts had the highest per capita 
property tax revenue in 2014: Wheatland collected $3,527 and Bighorn collected $3,129, the result 
of significant amounts of property taxes levied on machinery and equipment and linear property 
discussed further below. By contrast, Black Diamond only collected $297 in per capita property 
tax revenue, whereas Calgary collected $1,162 per capita.
Residential property taxes make up about 60 per cent of total property tax revenues collected by 
Calgary, with the remaining 40 per cent from commercial and industrial property. In the other 
urban municipalities in the Calgary Region, residential property taxes are a larger share of total 
property tax revenues, ranging from around 70 per cent in Canmore to 95 per cent in Chestermere. 
The composition of property tax revenues varies among the four municipal districts. Residential 
property taxes are less than 20 per cent of Wheatland County’s total property tax revenues 
and less than 30 per cent of Bighorn’s. Property taxes on machinery and equipment and linear 
32 
Business taxes, a significant source of revenue for Calgary but not for Edmonton, are included in the Other category of 
revenue.
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property contributed 65 per cent of Wheatland’s property tax revenues and 36 per cent of 
Bighorn’s property tax revenues. On the other hand, residential property taxes have been the 
largest source of property tax revenue in Rocky View (60 per cent) and in Foothills, where the 
share of residential property taxes has increased from 51 per cent in 1994 to 72 per cent in 2014. 
In all of the municipal districts, property taxes on farmland have fallen as a share of total property 
taxes, representing only six per cent of property taxes in Wheatland, three per cent in Foothills 
and Rocky View, and less than one per cent in Bighorn.
Effective Non-Residential Mill Rates in the Calgary Metropolitan Region33
Figure 5 shows that there has been a convergence in the effective non-residential mill rates in 
Calgary, Airdrie, the directly adjacent MD of Foothills and Rocky View County, and nearby 
Wheatland County. In 2002, the non-residential mill rates ranged from 13.8 in Calgary to 
3.3 in Rocky View. Subsequently, the non-residential mill rates in Airdrie and the municipal 
districts have converged and by 2015, the differential was less than one mill. While Calgary has 
maintained the highest effective mill rate for non-residential property, it has come down from 
15.2 in 2004 to 10.7 in 2015.34 Foothills and Rocky View have increased their non-residential 
mill rates since 2003, excluding the dip witnessed in all municipalities from 2006- to 2008, 
and Wheatland increased its non-residential mill rate between 2008 and 2015. So while tax 
competition may have resulted in lower non-residential mill rates in Calgary and Airdrie, the 
convergence of mill rates has resulted from increases in the non-residential mill rates in the 
three municipal districts. 
FIGURE 5 SELECTION OF EFFECTIVE NON-RESIDENTIAL MILL RATES IN THE CALGARY REGION
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This trend in non-residential mill rates is consistent with increasing competition among 
these municipalities for the non-residential tax bases, especially industrial and commercial 
property, but it could also be consistent with collusion. It is also interesting to note that all of 
the municipalities (except High River) imposed a higher non-residential property tax rate than 
the rate on residential property in 2013. Figure 6 shows the ratio of the non-residential mill 
rate to the residential mill rate in Calgary, the larger peripheral urban municipalities and three 
municipal districts in 2003 and 2013. In all of the municipalities, except in High River, the 
33 The reported mill rates are the adjusted effective mill rates as discussed at the beginning of Section 5.
34 The fact that Calgary, the dominant municipality in the region, maintains the highest non-residential mill rate is also 
consistent with the models of tax competition between jurisdictions of different sizes of. The Kanbur and Keen model 
predicts that the smaller jurisdiction will have the lower tax rate because the elasticity of its tax base with respect to its 
tax rate is higher and therefore it has more to gain from a lower tax rate than a larger jurisdiction would. Ravi Kanbur 
and Michael Keen, “Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size,” The 
American Economic Review 83, 4 (September 1993): 877-892.
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ratio exceeded one in 2013. This ratio has also increased over the 10 years in all municipalities 
except Calgary, where it fell from 3.51 in 2003 to 2.89 in 2013. The increase in the ratio of non-
residential to residential mill rates in the three municipal districts (and Canmore) is particularly 
striking. The higher relative property tax rate on non-residential property means that an 
additional dollar of industrial and commercial property generates more tax revenues than 
an additional dollar of residential property assessment, which may affect the pattern of land 
development in the Calgary Region.
FIGURE 6 RATIO OF THE NON-RESIDENTIAL TO THE RESIDENTIAL MILL RATE IN SELECTED CALGARY  
  REGION MUNICIPALITIES IN 2003 AND 2013
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Effective Residential Mill Rates in the Calgary Region
Figure 7 shows the effective residential mill rates in selected urban municipalities in the 
Calgary Region from 2001 to 2015. There is some convergence in the mill rates, from a range 
of 5.14 mills in 2001 to 3.78 mills in 2015, but the convergence is much smaller than was 
observed in Figure 5 for the non-residential mill rates. Furthermore, the residential mill rates 
in most of the urban municipalities declined and converged in the 2005 to 2009 period, and 
then increased in the following six years. Note that the non-residential mill rates also declined 
during this period.35
35 The decline in the non-residential rates for Calgary parallels the rise and fall of non-residential equalized assessments 
(relative to personal income) as reported in McMillan and Dahlby (2014, Figure 1), suggesting that the growth and decline 
of real assessments goes some way in explaining the variation in mill rates. 
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FIGURE 7 EFFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MILL RATES IN THE URBAN MUNICIPALITIES OF THE CALGARY REGION
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As shown in Figure 8, the trends in the residential mill rates in the four municipal districts 
in the Calgary Region can be explained in terms of the composition of their property tax 
revenues. As previously noted, property taxes on machinery and equipment and linear property 
have increased over time and have become the largest source of property tax revenues in the 
MD of Bighorn and Wheatland County. The increase in property tax revenues from these 
sources has allowed those municipalities to reduce their residential property tax rates, a fiscal 
response that was documented in an econometric study of municipal governments’ responses 
to an increase in machinery and equipment assessments in Conger and Dahlby.36 On the other 
hand, Rocky View County and the MD of Foothills, which receive relatively little revenue 
from property taxes on machinery and equipment and linear property, have maintained their 
residential property tax rates within relatively narrow ranges.
FIGURE 8 EFFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MILL RATES IN THE RURAL MUNICIPALITIES OF THE CALGARY REGION
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Sources of Revenue for Municipal Governments in the Edmonton  
Metropolitan Region 
Table 4 shows the composition of the municipal governments’ revenues in the Edmonton 
Region in 2014. Property taxes were the largest single source of revenue for most municipal 
36 
Brian Conger and Bev Dahlby, “Policy Forum: Taxation of Machinery and Equipment and Linear Property in Alberta,” 
Canadian Tax Journal 63, 2 (2015): 487-99. 
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governments. On average, property taxes represented 40 per cent of revenues of the 24 
municipalities in the Edmonton Region, eight percentage points higher than in the Calgary 
Region. Sales and user charges contributed 20 per cent of revenues in Edmonton and close to 
27 per cent of revenues in the peripheral urban municipalities. Sales and user charges were a 
relatively small source of revenues in the four municipal districts account for roughly 7 per 
cent; however, sales and user charges accounted for 22 per cent in Strathcona County.37 In 
contrast with Calgary, Edmonton did not obtain revenues from business taxes in 2014. 
TABLE 4 COMPOSITION OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE IN THE EDMONTON REGION IN 2014
MUNICIPALITY Municipal Property Taxes
Sales and User 
Charges
Franchise and 
Concession 
Contracts
Contributed and 
Donated Assets
Federal 
Government 
Conditional and 
Unconditional 
Transfers
Provincial 
Government 
Conditional and 
Unconditional 
Transfers
Other
EDMONTON 39.0% 20.2% 4.2% 5.6% 1.4% 9.4% 20.2%
BEAUMONT 26.9% 17.9% 2.0% 18.0% 1.4% 9.2% 24.5%
BON ACCORD 42.5% 37.2% 5.7% 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 5.4%
BRUDERHEIM 35.0% 30.7% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 14.5% 18.8%
CALMAR 41.0% 24.6% 5.4% 0.0% 0.7% 18.6% 9.6%
DEVON 28.1% 53.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 13.9% 3.3%
FORT 
SASKATCHEWAN 40.6% 19.7% 0.0% 14.7% 2.7% 4.6% 17.8%
GIBBONS 35.9% 30.8% 4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 21.1% 7.4%
LAMONT 31.6% 20.5% 3.7% 0.0% 0.1% 36.1% 8.0%
LEDUC 24.5% 12.6% 3.5% 29.5% 0.4% 14.4% 15.1%
LEGAL 40.2% 24.1% 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 21.4% 12.4%
MORINVILLE 36.6% 23.2% 6.2% 7.6% 0.0% 10.6% 15.8%
REDWATER 34.5% 46.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.9% 9.2%
SPRUCE GROVE 26.0% 21.7% 3.6% 17.7% 0.0% 18.3% 12.8%
ST. ALBERT 44.0% 27.2% 1.0% 6.2% 3.4% 9.2% 9.0%
STONY PLAIN 33.5% 27.7% 5.3% 2.1% 0.5% 10.0% 20.8%
THORSBY 44.3% 29.7% 6.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 18.1%
WABAMUN 32.2% 22.1% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 27.3% 17.8%
WARBURG 33.7% 15.0% 3.5% 0.0% 0.0% 22.8% 24.9%
Unweighted 
Average 35.1% 26.9% 3.0% 5.3% 0.6% 15.2% 13.9%
LAMONT COUNTY 64.0% 5.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 23.2% 7.6%
LEDUC COUNTY 52.3% 6.1% 0.0% 10.9% 0.0% 11.4% 19.3%
PARKLAND 
COUNTY 44.3% 6.9% 0.0% 21.9% 0.0% 14.6% 12.2%
STURGEON 
COUNTY 61.6% 10.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 15.3% 12.2%
Unweighted 
Average 55.6% 7.3% 0.0% 8.2% 0.0% 16.1% 12.8%
STRATHCONA 
COUNTY 50.5% 22.0% 0.7% 7.3% 0.8% 8.1% 10.5%
37 Strathcona County stands out from the other counties because Sherwood Park is 72 per cent of Strathcona County’s 
population and performs similar functions to the other cities in the Edmonton region. Strathcona County website, 
“Population through the years,” http://www.strathcona.ca/local-government/about-strathcona-county/strathcona-county-
history-and-heritage/at-a-glance/population-through-the-years/.
20
The median per capita property tax revenue in the 24 municipalities in the Edmonton Region in 
2014 was $1,052, almost $100 more than the median in the Calgary Region. The four municipal 
districts and Strathcona County ranked among the top six in terms of per capita property 
tax revenues. The only urban municipality among the top six was Fort Saskatchewan, and it 
receives a significant portion of its property tax revenues from the taxation of machinery and 
equipment. Lamont County collected $3,379, Leduc County collected $3,139, and Strathcona 
County collected $2,076 per capita. Lamont County’s largest source of property tax revenue 
is from the taxation of machinery and equipment and linear property, and the largest source 
of property tax revenue for Leduc County is industrial and commercial property. By contrast, 
Warburg only collected $658 per capita. Edmonton collected $1,409 per capita in 2014, almost 
$300 more than the per capita property taxes for Calgary. 
In 2014, residential property taxes represented 56 per cent of the total property tax revenues 
collected by Edmonton, with commercial and industrial property contributing 42 per cent, 
and linear property the remaining two per cent. In the peripheral urban municipalities in 
the Edmonton Region, residential property taxes are a larger share of total property tax 
revenues than in Edmonton, and as high as 83 per cent in St. Albert, but are only 47 per cent 
of total property tax revenues in Fort Saskatchewan where property taxes on machinery and 
equipment contributed 25 per cent of the property tax revenues in 2014. Property taxes on 
machinery and equipment and linear property are an important source of revenue for the three 
municipal districts north and east of Edmonton, an area that bills itself as “Alberta’s Industrial 
Heartland.”38 Strathcona County and Sturgeon County received 37 per cent of their property 
tax revenues from these sources, and these sources contributed 63 per cent of Lamont County’s 
total property tax revenues. Even Parkland County, which is west of the city of Edmonton and 
outside Alberta’s Industrial Heartland, received 24 per cent of its property tax revenues from 
machinery and equipment and linear property.
Leduc County’s non-residential property tax revenues are also significant, but come from 
a different source. Over half of Leduc County’s property tax revenues were received from 
commercial and industrial property, mainly in the Nisku Industrial Park. Farmland was a 
negligible source of tax revenue for all of the municipal districts, except Lamont County where 
it contributed nine per cent of total property tax revenues in 2014.
Effective Non-Residential Mill Rates in the Edmonton Metropolitan Region
In analyzing the trend in the effective non-residential mill rates in the Edmonton Region, it 
is useful to focus on two sub-regions: firstly, the municipalities that make up the ‘Industrial 
Heartland’ to the north and east of Edmonton, where competition (if it occurs) is for the 
property tax base associated with petrochemical projects; and secondly the peripheral urban 
municipalities and two counties that lie to the south and west of Edmonton—Leduc County and 
Parkland County—where the competition is for commercial and other industrial developments, 
what we will call the ‘Southwestern Commuter Shed’. Turning first to the Industrial Heartland, 
Figure 9 shows that Edmonton, and especially Lamont County, have maintained much higher 
38 
Alberta’s Industrial Heartland is an association of five municipalities—the City of Fort Saskatchewan, Lamont County, 
Strathcona County, Sturgeon County and the City of Edmonton— that promote industrial development in a region northeast 
of Edmonton through the co-ordinated provision of infrastructure, services, and land-use zoning. For a map of Alberta’s 
Industrial Heartland, see http://industrialheartland.com/images/stories/maps/alberta%20capital%20region%20-%202010.
pdf. 
21
non-residential mill rates than the other three municipalities.39 In all five municipalities, the 
non-residential mill rates declined between 2005 and 2009, a pattern that was also observed in 
the Calgary Region. Between 2009 and 2014, the median non-residential mill rate has increased 
by 3.12 mills or 46 per cent. In broad terms, the trend in non-residential mill rates of the five 
municipalities that make up the Industrial Heartland differs from that in the Calgary Region: 
that is, non-residential mill rates have tended to increase, especially since 2009. The dispersion 
in mill rates in 2001 was much lower than in the Calgary Region, especially among Strathcona 
County, Sturgeon County and Fort Saskatchewan, and there has not been the convergence of 
non-residential mill rates that was observed in the Calgary Region from 2001 to 2015.
FIGURE 9 EFFECTIVE NON-RESIDENTIAL MILL RATES IN THE INDUSTRIAL HEARTLAND SUB-REGION
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Figure 10 shows the trend in the effective non-residential mill rates for Edmonton, municipalities 
in the Southwestern Commuter Shed. In these municipalities, the non-residential mill rates 
also declined from 2004 to 2009, as in the Calgary Region and the Industrial Heartland, but 
the subsequent increase in the non-residential mill rates to 2015 is much smaller than in the 
Industrial Heartland to the north and east. As well, there has been a substantial convergence of 
the non-residential mill rates of the five municipalities, excepting Edmonton; a convergence that 
is similar to that which occurred in the Calgary Region as illustrated in Figure 5. 
FIGURE 10 EFFECTIVE NON-RESIDENTIAL MILL RATES IN THE SOUTHWESTERN COMMUTER SHED SUB-REGION
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39 We have not computed the effective non-residential mill rate for Lamont County for 2015 because of a suspected coding 
error in the reported data on the Alberta Municipal Affairs website.
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Although drawing conclusions based on these few observations is problematic, the 
determination of the non-residential mill rates seems to be different in the different sub-
regions. In the Industrial Heartland, the non-residential tax base is the machinery and 
equipment and linear property associated with the petrochemical industry and pipelines that are 
tied to specific locations because of agglomeration effects. This probably reduces the pressures 
on the municipalities in the Industrial Heartland to compete for the non-residential property 
tax base. On the other hand, among the municipalities in the Southwestern Commuter Shed 
there seems to be stronger competitive forces determining the non-residential mill rates for 
commercial property and other industrial developments that are less tied to specific locations.
Effective Residential Mill Rates in the Edmonton Metropolitan Region
Figure 11 shows that the effective residential mill rates in the larger urban municipalities in the 
Edmonton Region also declined from 2001 to 2008 and then increased by one to two mills by 
2015. There has also been a convergence of the residential mill rates, from a range of 3.55 mills 
in 2001 to 2.52 mills in 2015. St. Albert imposed the highest effective residential mill in 2015, 
followed by Edmonton. Fort Saskatchewan had the lowest. 
FIGURE 11 RESIDENTIAL MILL RATES IN THE PERIPHERAL URBAN MUNICIPALITIES OF THE EDMONTON REGION
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Figure 12 shows the effective residential mill rates in the five municipal districts in the 
Edmonton Region and Edmonton itself. The trend is broadly similar to what was observed 
for the peripheral urban municipalities in the Edmonton Region, but with a steeper decline 
and much greater convergence of the non-residential mill rates in the five municipal districts. 
Edmonton’s mill rate in 2015 was highest and 2.22 mills or 40 per cent higher than the median 
effective residential mill rate in the four municipal districts and Strathcona County.
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FIGURE 12 EFFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MILL RATES IN EDMONTON AND THE MUNICIPAL DISTRICTS IN  
  THE EDMONTON REGION
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Figure 13 shows the ratio of the non-residential mill rate to the residential mill in selected urban 
municipalities, the four municipal districts and Strathcona County in 2003 and 2013. In all of 
the municipalities, the non-residential rate exceeded the residential rate in 2013. In Edmonton, 
the ratio increased from 2.45 to 2.75, but among urban municipalities the largest increase was 
in Fort Saskatchewan, where the ratio increased from 0.90 to 1.91. Only in the city of Leduc 
was there a reduction in the ratio of non-residential to residential mill rates.
In the four municipal districts and Strathcona County, the ratio of non-residential to residential 
mill rates exceeded two, and in Lamont it increased from 1.94 in 2003 to 5.76 in 2013. This 
increase is a reflection of the trends shown in Figures 9 and 12 where the non-residential mill 
rates have increased over time and the residential mill rates have decreased.
FIGURE 13 RATIO OF THE NON-RESIDENTIAL TO THE RESIDENTIAL MILL RATE IN SELECTED EDMONTON  
  REGION MUNICIPALITIES IN 2003 AND 2013
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4. DEVELOPMENT IN ALBERTA’S METROPOLITAN REGIONS
Both the Calgary Metropolitan Plan and the Capital Region Growth Plan contain policy 
concerning the nature of development in their respective planning areas. For example, The 
CMP contains nebulous policy around the creation of a Regional Open Space Strategy (1.b.5) 
and encourages industrial and commercial development to established areas across the 
region (2.A.4), as well as clear policies around minimum residential densities (3.a.5) and the 
intensification of existing developed areas (3.a.7). Likewise, in the Edmonton Region it is the 
Capital Region Land Use Plan (which is Appendix 2 of the CRGP) that contains land use policy 
that discourages natural resource extraction (I.C.(i)), directs most new growth to within priority 
growth areas (II.B.(i); however, with regards to densification, the Land Use Plan takes the 
approach of supporting the expansion of medium and higher density residential housing forms 
(II.D(i)) over the minimum densities approach of the CMP.40 Also different from the CMP 
the Capital Region Land Use Plan, as a result of having rural municipal districts within the 
planning area, contains policy in support of cluster country residential development (II.E.(i)). 
Both plans contain high-level, or regional-scale, policy on regional public transit networks. 
Even with comprehensive regional planning frameworks in place in the majority of the Calgary 
and Edmonton Regions, the plans do not effectively address the underlying competition for 
property tax revenue between municipalities, nor the ability of municipalities to compete 
for development by manipulating their property taxes as examined in Section 3. This is 
increasingly important in the interface between urban and rural municipalities, known as the 
rural-urban fringe. The rural-urban fringe is a unique geography within rural municipalities 
where industrial and commercial development “often gravitate(s) … because land prices, cost 
of servicing, and property taxes tend to be much lower there than in the nearby urban centre.”41 
Furthermore, this development benefits from proximity to potential markets and a large labour 
pool in the adjacent urban centres. A common criticism of land-use intensification on the rural-
urban fringe is that while “the rural host municipality will of course enjoy the tax base that 
will be generated … the neighbouring urban local government unit may be forced to improve 
its roadway infrastructure to accommodate increased traffic generated by the project, not to 
mention providing all the urban services and amenities for project staff residing within (the 
rural municipality’s) boundaries.” 42 
In order to examine trends in the patterns and locations of development within the Calgary and 
Edmonton Regions, we use building permit data from Statistics Canada to review the location 
of residential, commercial and industrial development occurring in each metropolitan region.43 
The development figures in this study are limited to new constructions only. 
40 
Capital Region Growth Board “Capital Region Land Use Plan, Appendix 2 March 2009” http://www.assembly.ab.ca/lao/
library/egovdocs/2009/alma/172916_02.pdf, accessed November 15, 2016.
41 Laux, Planning Law, 5-27.
42 ibid.
43 Statistics Canada, Building Permits, Publication 64-001-XWF. The original currency figures were in thousands of dollars, 
and have been manipulated for ease of presentation. All dollar figures were converted to 2014 dollars for ease of calculation 
and analysis. Residential permit values were converted using the new housing-price index obtained from CANSIM Table 
327-0046. Industrial permit values and commercial permit values were converted using the non-residential building-
construction-price index for industrial structures and commercial structures obtained from CANSIM Table 327-0043. 
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Residential Development
We begin by examining the residential building permits issued from 1983 to 2014 in both 
metropolitan regions. Figure 14 shows the total value (in 2014 dollars) of residential building 
permits issued for new construction. Starting from less than $1 billion in 1983, the value of 
residential building permits increased and peaked at $4.6 billion in 2005. The financial crisis 
of 2008 to 2010 was the backdrop to the sharp drop in residential construction in the Calgary 
Region, before it recovered back to $4.6 billion in 2013. A different pattern of growth is 
observed in the Edmonton Region. Starting from almost the same level as the Calgary Region 
in 1983, the value of building permits in the Edmonton Region fluctuated around $1 billion per 
year until 2000, after which a rapid increase occurred reaching a total value of $3.9 billion in 
2014. As in the Calgary Region, the financial crisis and the resulting impact on international oil 
prices caused a downturn in the value of building permits throughout the Edmonton Region, 
but the downturn was smaller and the rebound was more rapid than in the Calgary Region.
FIGURE 14 VALUE OF RESIDENTIAL BUILDING PERMITS IN THE CALGARY AND EDMONTON REGIONS
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Where has the new residential construction occurred? Figures 15 and 16 show the shares of the 
value of the building permits in the core-cities, peripheral urban areas and municipal districts 
within the two metropolitan regions. Calgary’s share of new residential construction declined 
from almost 90 per cent in 1988 to 68 per cent in 2008. Since then, it has rebounded to 75 per 
cent of the regional total in 2014. Figure 15 also shows that the peripheral urban areas—such as 
Airdrie, Cochrane, and Chestermere—have substantially increased their overall share of new 
residential construction over this period. By contrast, the share of new construction occurring 
in the municipal districts—Rocky View County, MD of Foothills, Wheatland County, and 
MD of Bighorn—has remained relatively constant. However, one interesting aspect of the 
pattern of new residential construction is that the average values of the new units constructed 
in Rocky View County and the MD of Foothills are substantially higher than the values in 
either Calgary or Airdrie. Over the entire period, 1983 to 2014, the average value of the new 
residential construction per unit was $593,239 in Rocky View County and $493,493 in the MD 
of Foothills, and since 2008, the average value of the building permits in Rocky View County 
was over $750,000 and over $640,000 in the MD of Foothills. In contrast, the average value 
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of new construction from 1983 to 2014 was $265,294 in Calgary and $231,254 in Airdrie, and 
the values in recent years are similar to these long-term averages. Thus, per unit residential 
property tax bases of Rocky View County and the MD of Foothills appears to have increased 
faster than in Calgary and the peripheral urban areas.
FIGURE 15 SHARES OF THE TOTAL VALUE OF RESIDENTIAL BUILDING PERMITS IN THE CALGARY REGION
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As in Calgary, Edmonton’s share of the total value of residential building permits also declined, 
from 69 per cent of the total in the Edmonton Region to 50 per cent in 1999. During this period, 
the percentage of new residential construction in the municipal districts, and in particular 
Strathcona County, increased rapidly to 25 per cent of the total by 1999. Since that time, and 
with the exception of the 2005–2008 period, Edmonton’s share of new residential construction 
increased to 73 per cent of the total value in 2014. Over the entire 1983 to 2014 period, the new 
residential units constructed in the Edmonton Region were of similar average value in all of the 
municipalities, but since 2005 the average value of the units constructed in Sturgeon County, 
Leduc County, and Parkland County have been significantly higher than those in the Edmonton 
and the peripheral urban municipalities.
FIGURE 16 SHARES OF THE TOTAL VALUE OF RESIDENTIAL BUILDING PERMITS IN THE EDMONTON REGION
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There are significant differences in the trend in residential construction in the two metropolitan 
regions. A higher percentage of their respective regions’ total has occurred in Calgary than 
in Edmonton because the peripheral urban municipalities in the Edmonton Region are larger 
and because of the growth of the hamlet/urban service area of Sherwood Park in Strathcona 
County. However, since 2000, Edmonton’s share has increased, and in 2014 it was 73 per cent, 
higher than at any other time since 1983, while Calgary’s share has stabilized at around 71 per 
cent. Given the current volatility in the local economy, and its impacts on net in-migration, it is 
impossible to comment on whether these trends will continue in the future. One similar trend 
in both regions, however, is that the average value of units constructed in the neighbouring 
municipal districts has been much higher than in the core cities, indicating that the population 
expansions in these districts have resulted in higher per unit property tax bases. 
Commercial Development
Figure 17 shows the trend in value of building permits for new commercial construction in the 
Calgary and Edmonton Regions from 1983 to 2014. While the Edmonton Region shows stable 
growth, there were extreme surges in the value of commercial building permits issued in the 
Calgary Region in 1998, 2004 to 2008, and 2013.
FIGURE 17 VALUE OF COMMERCIAL BUILDING PERMITS IN THE CALGARY AND EDMONTON REGIONS
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Figures 18 and 19 show the distribution of commercial building permits issued in the core-
cities, the peripheral urban areas, and the municipal districts in the two metropolitan regions. 
Looking at the data, the spike in rural development in 2009 largely occurred in Rocky View 
County, which is likely related to the construction of the CrossIron Mills shopping centre that 
opened in August that year and ancillary development around the shopping centre. While 
development, such as CrossIron Mills or the Century Downs Casino and Racetrack (opened in 
2015), draws attention and economic activity to Rocky View County, Calgary has retained is 
dominant position in its region with regard to commercial development, having averaged 82 per 
cent of the regional total since 1983.
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FIGURE 18 SHARES OF THE TOTAL VALUE OF COMMERCIAL BUILDING PERMITS IN THE CALGARY REGION
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In contrast, Edmonton has seen a long-term decline in its share of new commercial 
development, from 87 per cent of the regional total in the 1980s to less than 60 per cent in the 
2011–14 period. There has been a remarkable increase in the share of commercial building 
permits in the municipal districts, especially in Leduc County with the growth of Nisku, and 
in Strathcona County with the growth of Sherwood Park. Over the 32-year period under study, 
commercial activity in the Edmonton Region has become more decentralized, to the benefit 
of the adjacent rural municipal districts (including Sherwood Park) over the peripheral urban 
municipalities.
FIGURE 19 SHARES OF THE TOTAL VALUE OF COMMERCIAL BUILDING PERMITS IN THE EDMONTON REGION
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Industrial Development
Figure 20 shows the trend in value of building permits for new industrial building permits in 
the Calgary and Edmonton Regions from 1983 to 2014. Given that new industrial developments 
are often large and discrete, it is not surprising that these series show large fluctuations, 
especially in the Edmonton Region in 1989, 1998, and 2008. Over the entire period, the total 
value of industrial building permits issued was $4.2 billion in the Edmonton Region compared 
to $3.3 billion in the Calgary Region.
FIGURE 20 VALUE OF INDUSTRIAL BUILDING PERMITS IN THE CALGARY AND EDMONTON REGIONS
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Figures 21 and 22 show that the distribution of industrial building permits issued in the core 
cities, the other urban areas, and the municipal districts in the two regions fluctuated greatly 
from year to year. Calgary’s share ranged from 94 per cent in 1986 to nine per cent in 1991, 
while it averaged 67 per cent over the entire 1983 to 2014 period. The municipal districts in the 
Calgary Region accounted for 23 per cent of the total, with Rocky View County receiving the 
largest share.
FIGURE 21 SHARES OF THE TOTAL VALUE OF INDUSTRIAL BUILDING PERMITS IN THE CALGARY REGION
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Figure 22 shows that Edmonton’s share of total industrial building permits has also fluctuated 
a great deal and averaged only 39 per cent of the total over the 34-year period under study. The 
five municipal districts in the Edmonton Region have accounted for 45 per cent of the total over 
the entire period. Since 2000, Strathcona County has received 22 per cent and Leduc County 
has received 15 per cent of the total compared to 37 per cent in the city of Edmonton. Overall, 
industrial development has been larger and more dispersed in the Edmonton Region than in 
the Calgary Region. While the city of Edmonton has received the largest share of industrial 
development, Strathcona County and Leduc County are important destinations as well. By 
contrast, most of the industrial development in the Calgary Region, even in recent years, has 
occurred within Calgary.
FIGURE 22 SHARES OF THE TOTAL VALUE OF INDUSTRIAL BUILDING PERMITS IN THE EDMONTON REGION
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ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROPERTY TAXATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The goal of this study has been to better understand the connection between municipal 
revenue generation and development in the Calgary and Edmonton metropolitan regions. 
Municipalities in both metropolitan regions rely mainly on property taxation for their own-
source tax revenues. However, there are substantial differences in the per capita revenues 
raised by some of the municipal districts and urban municipalities, largely due to variation 
in the non-residential tax base. The main exceptions are the MD of Foothills and Rocky 
View County in the Calgary Region which currently do not receive substantial amounts of 
non-residential property tax revenues. In the Edmonton Region, the three municipal districts 
(especially Lamont County) that comprise the ‘Industrial Heartland’ and the city of Fort 
Saskatchewan impose relatively high non-residential property tax rates, and have relatively 
low residential property tax rates. Whether the low residential property tax rates in these 
municipalities have resulted in more residential development is difficult to assess. It is possible 
that the residential property tax differentials between Edmonton and the peripheral urban 
municipalities in the Edmonton Region have been capitalized in the value of the land zoned 
for housing developments and therefore eroded the advantage of building new residences in 
these municipalities. 
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In fact, the petrochemical and associated industrial projects in the ‘Industrial Heartland’ 
are relatively limited in location choice because of agglomeration effects. This has allowed 
the municipalities in this sub-region to have relatively high non-residential tax rates without 
displacing these investments to other municipalities within the Edmonton Region. In the 
Calgary Region, the competition between Calgary and the neighbouring MD of Foothills and 
Rocky View County is over relatively “footloose” commercial and industrial developments. 
The convergence of the non-residential tax rates in the Calgary Region could be interpreted 
as evidence of competition for these geographically mobile projects, although this explanation 
seems, at least on the surface, inconsistent with the increases in non-residential mill rates in the 
MD of Foothills and Rocky View County.
The role that the source of municipal revenue has played in determining development patterns 
has taken place within the context of rapid population growth and economic development in 
both regions. While there has been some decentralization of the urban populations, Calgary 
accounted for 74 per cent, and Edmonton 66 per cent of the population growth in their 
respective metropolitan regions. There has not been a marked increase in the share of the 
population living in the rural areas surrounding Calgary and Edmonton, if Sherwood Park, 
Strathcona County’s urban service area, is considered a peripheral urban municipality. 
When this study was started, one of the things we thought we might witness was unbridled 
growth in the rural municipal districts as a result of the devolution of regional planning with 
the enactment of the 1995 Municipal Government Act – this was not the case. In line with 
their shares of total population growth, Calgary and Edmonton have been the locations for 
the bulk of new residential development in their respective metropolitan regions. However, 
one interesting trend is that the average value of the new units constructed in the surrounding 
rural municipalities is much higher than in the core-cities of Calgary and Edmonton. With 
regard to both new commercial and industrial development, the Edmonton Region has become 
more decentralized over the last three decades, with a significant increase in the shares of 
new commercial and industrial building permits in Leduc County and Strathcona County. In 
contrast, Calgary has retained its dominant share of commercial and industrial development.
Metropolitan Taxation and Development in an Era of Mandatory  
Intermunicipal Collaboration
The current planning frameworks in place around Calgary and Edmonton provide over-
arching direction on the nature and density of development in each metropolitan region. They 
were designed, in part, to protect the needs and interests of the core-cities of Calgary and 
Edmonton in the policy vacuum created by the adoption of the Municipal Government Act 
in 1995. While the Municipal Government Act was a watershed moment for municipalities 
across the province—fundamentally re-shaping the nature of intermunicipal planning and 
development—the burden of much of the proposed legislation in the Modernized Municipal 
Government Act will fall on the cities, small towns, villages and municipal districts away from 
both metropolitan regions. That being said, the forced collaboration of municipalities within the 
Calgary Region under the rubric of a growth management board is a continuation of a process 
that parallels what has already happened in the Edmonton Region – once again completing the 
virtuous cycle of metropolitan-scale planning that first surfaced in Alberta in the 1950s.
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Critically, the ability of municipalities to set their own property tax rates ensures some 
flexibility in these systems, enabling municipalities to compete for development by setting 
competitive property tax rates. Meaning that while growth outside of Calgary and Edmonton 
will be more controlled under the growth management boards, it will not be constrained in the 
manner that it was under the regional planning commissions. 
Going forward, the growth management boards in both metropolitan regions should be careful 
to not stifle intermunicipal competition. Such a move would impact the economic sustainability 
of the peripheral urban municipalities and municipal districts to the benefit of Calgary and 
Edmonton and erode the benefits that intermunicipal competition brings to businesses and 
taxpayers.
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A RULE OF REASON FOR INWARD FDI: INTEGRATING CANADIAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW AND COMPETITION POLICY
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Foreign-Investment-Bishop-Final.pdf
Grant Bishop | October 2016
FROM IMPACT ASSESSMENT TO THE POLICY CYCLE: DRAWING LESSONS FROM THE EU’S BETTER-REGULATION AGENDA
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Financial-Regulation-Renda.pdf
Andrea Renda | October 2016
GETTING FINANCIAL REGULATIONS RIGHT: AVOIDING UNINTENDED EFFECTS
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Financial-Regulations-Coolidge-Mintz.pdf
Jacqueline Coolidge and Jack Mintz | October 2016
ON THE ROLE & FUTURE OF CALGARY’S COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Community-Associations-Conger-Goodbrand-GondekFINAL-1.pdf
Brian Conger, Jyoti Gondek and Pernille Goodbrand | October 2016
DO INSIDERS COMPLY WITH DISCLOSURE RULES? EVIDENCE FROM CANADA, 1996-2011
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Insider-Trading-TeddsFINAL.pdf
Lindsay M. Tedds | October 2016
WHAT STATISTICS CANADA SURVEY DATA SOURCES ARE AVAILABLE TO STUDY NEURODEVELOPMENTAL CONDITIONS AND DISABILITIES IN 
CHILDREN AND YOUTH?
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Neurodevelopmental-Arim-Findlay-Kohen.pdf
Rubab G. Arim, Leanne C. Findlay and Dafna E. Kohen | September 2016
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE ECONOMICS OF CARBON PRICING
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Carbon-Pricing-McKitrickFINAL.pdf
Ross McKitrick | September 2016
THE VERY POOR AND THE AFFORDABILITY OF HOUSING
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Affordability-of-Housing-Kneebone-Wilkins.pdf
Ron Kneebone and Margarita Gres Wilkins | September 2016
CHALLENGES FOR DEMOCRACIES IN RESPONDING TO TERRORISM: A VIEW FROM CANADA AND ISREAL
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Challenges-for-Democracy-Rioux-Shields.pdf
Jean-Sébastien Rioux and Maureen Shields | September 2016
